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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL S. SCHOW and 
DORIS SCHOW, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-YS.-
GUARDTONE, INC., et al, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No.10546 
Brief of Respondent Prudential 
Federal Savings and Loan Association 
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association 
will be ref erred to herein as ''Prudential.'' 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this action appellants seek the cancellation of a 
a Home Modernization Contract on the ground of fraud. 
Prudential seeks recovery against appellants on said 
contract for the balance claimed to be due and owing 
thereon, plus attorney's fees and costs. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury and submitted on spe-
cial interrogatories. Some of the interrogatories were 
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answered favorably and some adversely to Prudential. 
The court granted judgment notwithstanding the v d' . er ict 
m favor of Prudential and against the appellants for 
$871.99 and $300.00 attorney's fees and costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Prudential seeks to have the judgment in the lower 
court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' statement of facts is incomplete, argu. 
mentative and not supported by reference to the rec-
ord. Consequently Prudential submits its own state. 
ment of facts. 
On or about September 8, 1962, appellants were con-
tacted by a man by the name of Albert J. Hughes (R. 
212) who spent some four hours with them during which 
time he showed a film strip and made a sales presenta-
tion with reference to an Intercom and Fire Alarm Sys· 
tern (R. 218). While Mr. Hughes was there the contract 
(Ex. 1), the Home Modernization Contract (Ex. 11), th0 
Bonus Appointment Guarantee and Second Bonus Ap-
pointment Guarantee (Ex. 5) and the Advertising 
Agreement (Ex. 6) were executed. During the following 
week the equipment was installed (R. 227). Following 
installation of the equipment, the Borower's Completion 
Statement (Ex. 12) was executed by Mr. Schow. Guard· 
tone Inc. assigned the Home Modernization Contract 
' ' . l 
to Prudential Ex. 11 and Ex. 12) and Prudential paw 
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Guardtone, Inc. therefor. (Ex. 17 and Ex. 18) Before 
purchasing the contract a representative of Prudential 
talked with Mrs. Schow on the telephone and was ad-
visea by her that the Schows were happy with the unit 
and kne'v they were to make payments to Prudential 
regardless of the referral program. (Ex. 16, R. 311) 
Prudential sent a coupon book to appellants along with 
" Loan Completion Questionnaire (Exhibi1t 13), in which 
appellants were advised that Prudential had purchased 
their contract. Thereafter appellants made six payments 
to Prudential as provided for in the contract (R. 254) 
Appellants ceased making payments to Prudential, not 
because of any complaint against Prudential but be-
cause they claim the ''Guard tone people had not lived up 
to their contract.'' (R. 255) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED. 
The court granted motions for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict on the ground that the evidence 
failed to show that at the time of the transactions the 
def end ants fraudulently intended not to perform their 
agreements. (R. 178) 
In support of their contention that Guardtone never 
intended to perform, appellants call attention to the 
rhange of the Guardtone telephone number; that its tele-
phone was disconnected; that its salesman failed to keep 
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appointments; that Hughes, the salesman who sold the 
equipment to appellants disappeared, could not be served 
with summons and did not appear at the trial; and finally 
that no payments were made to them for referrals. 
The foregoing circumstances indicate nothing more 
than a failure to perform, which this court has held to he 
insufficient to show a preconceived intention not to per-
form (see cases cited below). However, were it admitted 
that such circumstances support a preconceived inten-
tion not to perform, appellants cannot escape their 
own admissions that no such intention, in fact, existed. 
Appellants understood they were obligated to make the 
payments in the purchase contract to Prudential (R. 
244-245-253). Appellants admitted they had been re-
f erred to Guard tone by Cecil Chamberlain and that he 
was paid $100.00 for such referral. (R. 261) Appellants 
knew that at least two or three persons included in the 
list of names furnished by them had been contacted by 
salesmen of Guardtone. (R. 262) Instead of indicating 
an intent not to perform, the admissions of appellants 
show part performance. 
This court has repeatedly held that a preconcenved 
intent not to perform is not established by proof of 
failure to perform. (Hull v. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 27 P. 
2d 56; Nielson v. Leamington Mines & Exploration Cor-
poration Corportion, 87 Utah 69, 48 P. 2d 439; Fleming 
v. Fleming-Felt Company, 7 Utah 2d 293, 323 P. 2d 712.\ 
The lower court in granting the motions followed 
what appears to be the universal rule that fraud muBt 
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be proved by clear and convincing evidence. (Kelly v. Salt 
Lake Tr(]Jrtsportation Comp(]Jrty, 100 Utah 436, 116 P. 2d 
383: Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Sohm, 15 Utah 2d 
262, 391 P. 2d 293; Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Company, 
7 Utah 2d, 293, 323 P. 2d 712.) 
In the Fleming case supra, this court said: 
"In respect to the issue of fraud we are con-
strained to agree with the defendants that the 
trial court was in error. One of its essential ele-
ments is the knowing false representation, of a 
presently existing material fact, which must be 
proved by clear and convincing evidence.'' 
The presumption of the law is against fraud and in 
favor of honesty as is borne out by a statement from 51 
A. L. R. 166 cited by appellants: 
'' * * • A wide latitude should be allowed as to 
the intrduction of evidence on the question, but the 
facts which show the intention not to perform 
the promises must be clear and unquestioned, and 
courts of chancery will indulge no presumption 
or surmises of fraud. The presumption is that a 
person ma.king a representation as to what he ex-
pects or hopes is about to take place, in order to 
induce action on the part of the person to whom 
it is made, acts honestly, however extravagant 
such hopes may be. • • •" (Scott v. Empire Land 
Co. 1925; D. C.; 5 F. 2d 873, Kley v. Healy (1896), 
149 N. Y. 346, 44 N.E. 150). 
It is most difficult to conceive of any logical reason 
for the contention of appellants that Hughes and the 
companies he represented had no intention to contact the 
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referrals given them by appellants. Certainly the most 
lucrative source of prospects for sales was from referrals. 
Why shouldn't they be contacted~ There must be area-
son other than a supposed fraudulent intent, as the ap-
pellants would have this court believe. The real reason 
is found in a statement of Mr. Schow. He said, "If 
Guardtone had stayed in business we would have been 
retired.'' (R. 254) Something went wrong. Guardtone 
failed to stay in business. Failure of Guardtone to stay 
in business was the reason for not contacting people re-
f erred by appellants, but such failure is not evidence of 
a fraudulent intent not to contact them. 
In addition to the ground upon which the court based 
its ruling, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict in favor of Prudential was properly granted on 
the ground that the evidence shows that appellants had 
no right to rely on the representations to avoid liability 
on the purchase contract. 
This court stated in Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 
158 p. 2d 134, 137 : 
'' • • • It is fundamental that before anyone can 
have relief from a claimed fraud he must show not 
only that he relied on the misrepresentation but 
also that he had the right to rely on it. * * •" 
Appellants had no right to rely upon the claimed repre-
sentations to defeat liability on the purchase contract. 
The contract (Ex. 1) contains the following provision: 
"It is further understood and agreed that pay-
ment of compensation set forth in the Represen-
6 
tative 's Commission Agreement or in the Bonus 
Appointment Guarantee shall not in any way af-
fect the obligation of the purchaser as set forth 
by the terms and conditions of the contract for 
the purchase of equipment herein referred to." 
Paragraph 6 of the Bonus Appointment Guarantee, and 
of the Second Bonus Appointment Guarantee (Ex. 5) 
provides: 
''It is further understood and agreed that this 
guarantee shall not affect, in any way, the pur-
chase contract which equipment-owning represen-
tative has signed for the purchase of the Inter 
Comm. F. M. & A. M. Radio and fire alarm 
system.'' 
Paragraph 5 of the Advertising Agreement (Ex. 6) pro-
vides as follows : 
''This agreement, for compensation 8S a result of 
services rendered hereunder, is entered into subse-
quent to and separate and apart from, and does 
not aff eet and is not affected by any contracts 
for purchase of merchandise, goods and services." 
Mr. Schow testified that he read, believed and under-
stood Exhibits "5" and "6," and particularly the quoted 
provisions therefrom. (R. 252) He also said that the 
instruments "were the most important part" in caus-
ing him to sign the contract for the purchase of the 
equipment. (R. 248) The agreements to pay for refer-
rals upon which appellants rely are contained in Exhibits 
'' 5" and "6." These exhibits also contain the quoted 
provisions to the effect that the guarantee with respect 
to referrals ·would in no way affect the purchase contract 
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by which appellants became obligated to pay for the 
equipment. It has been held that there is no fraud in a 
promissory representation which is plainly contradicted 
by the stipulations of a binding written contract, (North-
rop v. Piper, 271 N.W. 487 (Minn.)). Nor can there be 
fraud where the contract upon which appellants rely for 
the payment of referrals contains provisions which in-
sulate the referral program from the obligations with 
respect to the purchase of the equipment, and where thl' 
contract precludes matters regarding the referral pro-
gram from being asserted by way of defense to liability 
on the purchase contract. Such being the case, app€llants 
had no right to rely on any representations with respect 
to the referral program to avoid liability on the purchase 
contract. 
The circumstances relied upon by appellants failed 
to meet the high standard required by law for the proof 
of fraud. Their admissions preclude a finding of fraudu-
lent intent. They had no right to rely upon the claimed 
representations to avoid liability on the purchase con-
tract. The court did not err in entering judgment not-
withstanding the verdict. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SEPARAT-
ING THE APPELLANTS' CLAIMS FOR 
TRIAL AND EXCLUDING PROFFERED 
EVIDENCE OF OTHER ALLEGED FRA-CD· 
ULENT PROMISES AND NON-PERFOmf-
ANCE. 
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In support of the foregoing Point II, Prudential 
adopts the argument of respondent Guardtone, Inc., con-
tained in Point 2 of its brief and respectfully requests 
the court to consider the same as though it were set forth 
herein. 
POINT NO. III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERM-
INING THAT APPELLANTS ARE INDEBTED 
TO PRUDENTIAL ON THE CONTRACT 
SUED UPON. 
The Court submitted to the jury the question of 
whether appellants, by their dealings with Prudential, had 
elected to treat Prudential as the assignee, owner and 
payee of the contract in question. The jury's answer was 
"Yes." (R. 154, 155) 
The finding of the jury is amply supported by the 
evidence. Mr. Schow signed a statement addressed to 
Prudential to the effect that the materials and/or work 
described in the Home Modernization Contract dated 
September 12, 1962, had been delivered and completed to 
his satisfaction. (Ex. 12) Appellants were advised, in 
wTiting, by Prudential that it had purchased their Home 
Improvement Note. (Ex. 13) Thereafter appellants made 
six payments of $29.40 each to Prudential as provided for 
in the contract. ( R. 254) Appellants received a coupon 
book from Prudential. Mrs. Schow advised Prudential 
that ''Our name on our coupon payment book was spelled 
wrong." (Ex. 13) (Emphasis ours.) Mrs. Schow had 
three telephone conversations with someone at Pruden-
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tial, two with reference to the installation of the eq · U!p-
ment and one in connection with Ex. 13. (R. 281) Mr. 
Schow said at one time he knew there were two Guard. 
tone Companies involved but thought they were connect-
ed with each other in some way. (R. 246) At onther time 
he testified that, so far as he was concerned, "Guard tone., 
was one concern, (R. 258) and, when asked whether it 
said "Gua.rdtone of Utah" or "Guardtone, Inc." would 
have made any difference to him, he said, "It could do·· 
- "It might do" but admitted that "Guardtone" was the 
represented company and that was all he was concerned 
about. (R. 258) 
Appellants argue that when a person sues on an as-
signed claim the obligor is entitled to the protection of 
being assured that payment to the assignee will discharge 
the obligation. Authorities cited by appellants are based 
upon this principle. The Court in Brown v. Esposito, 15i 
Pa. Supra 147, 42 At. 2d. 193, cited by appellants, state8, 
''This protection must be afforded tlie defendant; other-
wise the defendant might find himself subjected to the 
same liability to the original owner of the cause of action 
in the event there was no actual assignment.'' We are 
in accord with the argument of appellants and state-
ments of the Pennsylvania Court but respectfully urge 
that appellants have such protection in this case. Guard· 
tone of Utah and Guardtone, Inc., are parties in this 
action, have been served with process and are subject to 
the order of the Court. Neither has asserted owner-
ship of, or a claim on the contract herein sued upon. They 
are both bound by the judgment of this Court to the effect 
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that Prudential is the owner of the contract. Appellants 
cited Section 25-1-8 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
A mere reading of this section leads but to one conclusion 
-that it has no bearing on the question at hand. 
The jury found that the appellants elected to treat 
Prudential as the assignee, owner and payee of the con-
tract in question. Such finding is not only supported by 
the evidence but, so far as we are aware, there is no evi-
dence to the contrary. Appellants are protected against 
any elaim on the contract in question being asserted by 
Guardtone of Utah and Guardtone, Inc. Such being true, 
the Court did not err in holding that appellants are obli-
gated to Prudential on the contract herein sued upon. 
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CONCLUSION 
Prudential was not involved in the sale of merchan. 
dise to appellants. Prudential is in the finance business 
and as a financing institution purchased from respondent 
Guardtone, Inc., a contract executed by appellants in 
which they obligated themselves to pay Prudential. 
The evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support 
the verdict of the jury insofar as it is adverse to Pru-
dential. Before purchasing the contract, Prudential made 
inquiry of the appellants and was advised that they wm 
happy with the unit and understood they were to pay 
Prudential regardless of the ref err al program. Thr 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Pru-
dential should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HAROLD R. BOYER 
of ROMNEY & BOYER 
1409 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
.Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
Prudential Federal Savings 
and Loan .Association 
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